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For Joseph Fletcher, situation ethics is one of three possible
approaches to making moral decisions. Legalism bases moral
ity on rules and laws. Antinomianism denies the relevance of
any principles whatever. Situation ethics bases everything on
one principle
love or agape
and rejects all other principles
and rules. In effect, he includes the broad philosophical
tradition of “teleological ethics” within the situationist camp.
Aristotle’s ethics of self-realization, for instance, is classified as
a variety of “non-Christian situation ethics.”
3 Yet Fletcher
also insists that situation ethics is based on certain presuppo
sitions: It is pragmatic
the good is what works”
; it is
4
relativistic
right and wrong vary from situation to situation;
it is positivistic
based on a faith-commitment, not on reason;
and it is personalistic
putting people at the center. Once
he pins matters down: “Right and wrong depend upon the7
situation.” The Christian motive is always love; but each case
must be studied separately, in order to determine what is the
loving action in the particular situation.
Paul Lehmann prefers the term “contextual” ethics. Eth
ical decisions have to be made in the complex, concrete
contexts of human relationships. “Ethics is a matter not of
logic but of life.
Ethics is concerned to expose and explicate
the human reality of the concrete.”
6 This is especially true of
Christian ethics: “The fact that God became incarnate in Jesus
Christ
requires of Christian ethics that the diverse relation
ships in which men find themselves be taken seriously as
bearers of ethical reality and significance.”
7 The fullest
possible knowledge of all human factors in any situation is
indispensable to making a responsible ethical decision. But
knowledge of the situation is not the only factor in ethical
decision-making: “Ethical decisions, as Christians try to make
them, are behavioral acts which exhibit the connection between
what God is doing in the world and the diverse and complex
circumstances, motivations, purposes, and interrelations which
are the ‘stuff’ of concrete human situations.”
8 And what is
God doing? “What God is doing in the world is setting up
and carrying out the conditions for what it takes to keep human
life human.” In order to discern both the concreteness of each
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Traditionally, Christian morality has been a morality of
and the
rules, based on such codes as the Ten Commandments
yourself
a
for
make
not
Sermon on the Mount: You shall
not
shall
you
adultery;
graven image; you shall not commit
steal; do not resist one who is evil; judge not.
Re(:ently an increasing dissatisfaction with this traditional
emphasis has developed. Many Christians are saying that our
than
ethical judgments should center on concrete deeds, rather
labeled
been
has
on abstract general rules. This newer temper
“situation ethics,” “contextual ethics,” or simply “the new
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morality.”
The best known exponents of this new approach are Paul
Lehmann and Joseph Fletcher. An outstanding application of
situation ethics is found in the pamphlet, Towards a Quaker
out
View of Sex. The situationists have developed their views
by
1940’s
and
of some striking insights suggested in the 1930’s
in
And
theologians Emil Brunner and Dietrich Bonhoeffer.
draws
it
as
all,
one sense, the new morality is not so new at
inspiration from the dictum of St. Augustine: “Love God, and
do what you want.”
Since the situational thinkers vary in their precise defini
tions of situation ethics, we should examine their views respec
tively. Beginning with Emil Brunner, we note his insistence
will
that Christian ethics is obedience to God’s will; but “the
know
1 “Therefore we can never
of God is absolutely free.”
will require. God’s command can only
God
what
beforehand
attempt
be perceived at the actual moment of hearing it.” The
chief
to know in advance what we should do is legalism, the
adversary of true Christian ethics.
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human situation and just what will keep human life human,
’
1
the primary quality required of us is “imaginative sensitivity.”
Chris
Lehrnann.
for
meaning
second
Contextualism has a
the
of
context
the
within
tian ethics is moral responsibility
that
koinonia
the
in
“It
is
fellowship.
Christian community or
one comes in sight of and finds oneself involved in what God
’ Ethical decision-making is not indi
1
is doing in the world.”
vidualistic; it takes place within the Christian community.
The authors of Towards a Quaker View of Sex insist, with
Fletcher and Lehmann, that “Christianity is concerned with
relationships. . . . [Therefore,] in so far as we love the good and
know the mind of God we do not need rules and moral codes
2 In particular, there are no clear-cut
to guide our conduct.”
rules for sexual behavior, “precisely because we are dealing
with human relationships at their deepest, the point where
rules are irrelevant. But the point where rules cease to apply
is also the point at which our first and greatest need is to seek
3 It is not surprising that Quakers should
the will of God.”
push directly on from this point to contextualism in Lehmann’s
second sense: The search for a sexual morality “implies a high
something
standard of responsibility, thinking and awareness
The
code
much harder than simple obedience to a moral
whose
group
responsibility . . . must be responsibility within a
14
members are equally committed to the search for God’s will.”
rejec
the
\_...,, Clearly, the main emphasis in situation ethics is
tell
never
tion of legalism, the insistence that rules or laws can
us what is right or wrong. Rules may be helpful as guidelines,
but in many cases they will have to be discarded or broken.
Affirmatively, situation ethics makes one principle central:
love, or keeping human life human. The application of this
principle to each particular decision will be determined by full,
sensitive knowledge of the human situation in which the deci
sion is made.
N(
What is the advantage of situation ethics over Christian
legalism or an ethics of absolutely binding rules and prin
ciples? In the first place, any list of moral rules is limited in
number, but the situations to which these rules must be applied
are infinitely diverse and complex; in consequence any ethics
—

4

of absolute rules “pays a very heavy price for its claims. The
price is abstraction from the complexity of the actual situation
out of which the ethical problem
Fletcher insists
that a morality of rules not only tends to understand human
reality too abstractly; it even “falsifies reality situations by
oversimplifying them or actually twisting the facts.”
6 On the
other hand, where legalists are sensitive to the complexity of
human relationships, they are hard pressed to find ways of
applying their rules. They develop increasingly complicated
and devious casuistries, piling rules on top of rules, in order to
deal realistically and sensitively with all possible cases, until
the body of rules and interpretations becomes so complex that
only the most fully trained Jesuit or Talmudic scholar can
thread his way through the intricacies of the evolved moral
code.
Legalisni also has problems in meeting human needs.
Many people’s psychological needs are ignored or crushed by
a simple “thou shalt not.” Putting a pattern or code of rules
first can result in actual cruelty to those who are forced to fit
the pattern, regardless of their own individual needs and prob
leins. Only by making rules flexible and relative to human
needs can a moralist affirm “that morals, like the Sabbath, were
made br man, not man for morals.”
7 Furthermore. conditions
change over a period of time: rules that were relevant to an
earlier clay remain frozen in a new age where they no longer
apply. As a result,
and societies continue to give lip
service to rules which they no longer can observe in practice:
“In subscribing to a moral code, some of which it no longer
accepts, society merits the charge of hypocrisy and its authority
is weakened.”
Another moral weakness of legalism is that it fosters
irresponsibility: it encourages people to get by with fulfilling
merely the letter of the law, and feeling relieved of further
responsibility. “Legalism always emphasizes order and con
formity; situationism emphasizes freedom and responsibility.”
There is also a peculiarly Quaker reason for rejecting
legalism. In an ethics of rules, we know in advance what
actions are right and wrong, but “for Friends, God’s will for
5

1
man can never be circumscribed by any statement, however
inspired.... Quakerism involves a continuous search; and
because it is a genuine and not a formal search, it may lead
° The Quaker testi
2
to surprises and unexpected demands.”
mony against creeds applies to moral statements, as well as to
statements about God!
Finally, any Christian ethics must take seriously the ethical
insights of the New Testament. Both Jesus and Paul were
fervent opponents of legalism. Jesus justified the breaking of
sabbath rules with his dictum: “The sabbath was made for
man, not man for the sabbath.” (Mk. 2:27) He castigated
those who “tithe mint and dill and cummin, and have neglected
the weightier matters of the law, justice and mercy and faith.”
(Mt. 23:23) He repeatedly dismissed some of history’s most
distinguished exponents of legalism with the words: “Woe to
you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites!” (Mt. 23:13 and passiiii)
made to individu
Many of Jesus’ ethical pronouncements
als, in light of their own particular situations and needs, and
were apparently not intended for universal or general appli
cation.
Paul’s attack on legalism is even sharper. The law is a
“yoke of slavery” (Gal. 5:1), from which Christ has set us free.
“Now we are discharged from the law, dead to that which
held us captive, so that we serve not under the old written code
but in the new life of the Spirit.” (Rom. 7:6) Christians are
guided not by a legal code but by the Spirit: “If you are led
by the Spirit you are not under the law.” (Gal. 5:18) Paul’s
most trenchant criticism is reserved for those “Judaizing”
Christians who insisted on retaining the Jewish moral law.
were

Is situation ethics compatible with Quaker thought and
practice? Is it, indeed, the most adequate way to express
Quaker ethical insights today? In dealing with these questions,
this paper begins from the position that the thought and prac
tice of the first generation of Quakers is somehow normative.
The whole of Quakerism derives from the great wave of Chris
tian renewal that took place in the days of George Fox, James
Nayler, and William Penn. We cannot go back to a literal
6

•

-.

repetition or imitation of seventeenth-century Quakerism, but
the insights of that generation will form the basis for any
meaningful reconstruction or renewal of Quaker Christianity.
We niust therefore ask: Are the thought and practice of
the early Quakers compatible with, or suggestive of, situation
ethics? In the second sense of Lehmann’s contextualism, the
answer is yes. The “gospel order,” the early Quaker business
practices was a remarkable innovation in procedure, through
which decisions were made in the context of the Christian
community or koinonia.
But the crucial question is with the primary sense of
situationism or contextualism. Did the views of Fox and his
co-workers point away from absolute moral rules and toward
basing ethical decisions on the facts of each particular situa
tion? Some statements might suggest this. George Fox char
acteristically declared: “I was to direct people to the Spirit th
gave forth the Scriptures, by which they might be led into all’
These things I did not see by the help of man, nor
Truth
but I saw them in the light of the Lord Jesus
by the letter,
Christ, and by his immediate Spirit and power.”
21 Fox also
echoed Pau1s theme of the gospel as freedom from bondage:
“Therefore ye, who know. the freedom that is in Jesus Christ,
stand fast in him;
and be not entangled with the yoke of
bondagc. For the ministry of Christ Jesus and his teaching
bringeth into liberty and freedom.”
22 An example of Fox’J’
freedom to be led by the Spirit into different actions in different
situations is found in his response to John Story’s invitation
to smoke a pipe of tobacco: “Tobacco I did not take, but it
came into my mind that the lad might think I had not unity
with the creation, for I saw he had a flashy, empty notion of
religion; so I took his pipe and put it to my mouth and gave
it to him again to stop him.”
23
But the tobacco story is exceptional. Fox and the early
Friends usually insisted vigorously on tue absolute rightness or
wrongness of certain forms of action. The Spirit itself leads
uniformly to the rejection of certain types of behavior: “The
Spirit of Christ brings us to deny all manner of ungodliness, as
.
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24 One of the clear
lying, theft, murder, adultery, fornication.”
Declaration of 1660:
the
point
is
this
of
statements
est
The spirit of Christ, by which we are guided,
h not changeable, so as once to command us from
a thing as evil and again to move unto it; and we
do certainly know, and so testify to the world,
that the spirit of Christ, which leads us into all
truth, will never move us to fight and war against
any man with outward weapons.
1-le that hath commanded us diat we shall not
swear at all (Matt. 5:34), hath also commanded
us that we shall not kill (Matt. 5:21), so that we
can neither kill men, nor swear for nor against
them. And this is both our principle and prac
neither
tice. and hath been from the beginning;
shall we ever do it, because it is contrary to the
24
spirit of Christ.
distinction between spirit and letter was not
the
Furthermore,
universal moral laws, as is shown in this
out
rule
meant to
Nayler:
James
passage by
.

.

.

The coming of Christ was not to make void,
to fulfil the law.
And whereas it was said in the letter, thou shalt
not commit adultery, he saith, thou shalt not lust:
in the letter it was said, thou shalt not swear
falsely. but in the spirit, he saith, swear not at
all: in the letter, thou shalt not kill, but in the
spirit, thou shalt not be angry; and whosoever
(10th any of these things is guilty before God, and
this is far from making it void, which declares it
in its purity, so as they who might seem to be
clear in the letter, might be found guilty in the
28
law of the spirit.
l)Ilt

Nor does the doctrine of the Light Within help the situa
tionists. George Fox ringingly insisted in one of his earliest
doctrinal works that the Light reveals a definite set of moral
i l)i tions:
Fle that walks in the light, there is no occasion
of stumbling in him; it teacheth righteousness and
holiness; it will keep thee from lying, and not let

8

I

thee lye,
and never let thee Swear, it will
check thee if thou doest; the Light will not let
thee take God’s name in vain;
and will never
let thee follow Drunkenness, nor vain Company;
therefore beware, this Light will keep thee
from Adultery and Whoredom, for such will God
judge; and the Light will keep thee from Theft,
Quarrelling and Fighting, and Abusing thy self
with Mankind, and Envy.
27
.

.

.

.

.
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Fox also rna(le it clear that Christian freedom was not a free
(horn from rules and ordered patterns of life:
The Truth
makes them free from him that
abode not in the Truth, in whom there is no
Truth: So all God’s Free People or Children
(that are made free indeed by the Truth) are in
the Order of the Truth, and in the Order of the
Spirit of God, and in the Order of the Gospel, and
are in the Order of the Light, the Life in Christ,
and are over the foul Spirit of Disorder.
28
...

Early Quakers accepted nearly all of the moral rules of
their Puritan contemporaries; the chief difference was that
Friends added a few more rules, such as those against hat-honor
and against swearing. The great ethical insight of the early
Friends was their interpretation of certain ethical practices as
direct testimonies to their faith in Christ. Thus William Penn
could refer to plain language, refusal to fight, to swear, or to
pimy tithes, as well as Quaker marriage and burial practices,
under the heading of “several particular doctrines, that did
exemplify and farther explain the truth and efficacy of the
general doctrine”
29 of the Light of Christ within. The testi
monies were in effect absolute moral rules, and not simply
reports on the ways Friends happened to hear God’s word.
‘\rear it as
long as thou canst,” was not the characteristic
approach to these practices. If a Friend persisted in wearing
his courtly sword or even voluntarily removed his hat before a
judge, he would be lovingly but firmly labored with by the
Quaker community, until he either publicly recanted or was
publicly disowned.

/
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Far from favoring situation ethics, then, early Quakerism
actually widened the scope and heightened the intensity and
the centrality of absolute moral rules, as being a direct witness
to the reign of Christ.
Situation ethics can thus be justified as a contemporary
interpretation of the Quaker witness only by showing that the
original Quaker idea of an ethical testimony is no longer valid.
Even then, situationism can hardly be the right alternative,
for it can be shown that the situational position has serious
internal weaknesses, which render it problematic, even on its
own teims.
In the first place, Joseph Fletcher’s division of possible
etlucal approaches into legalism, antinomianism, and situation
ism is, like most typologies, an oversimplification. Typologies
can be powerful intellectual tools, when their limitations are
recognized. But Fletcher vastly overstates the case when he
insists that there are at bottom only three alternative routes
° We have
3
or approaches to follow in making moral decisions.”
already noted that he includes widely varied ethical systems
under “situationism.” But “legalism” also involves a great
variety of approaches. in particular, “legalism” in popular
usage implies an ethics in which every possible decision in life
is provided for within the framework of an incredibly complex
structure of rules and interpretations. But since situationism
means the absence of any binding rules, “legalism” must also
include ethical systems which provide a limited number of
moral rules, absolutely binding in regard to certain types of
behavior, but which also leave broad areas of action to be dealt
with by other types of ethical principles or even by free, spon
taneous decisions. Most of the arguments against legalism.
used to justify situation ethics, are arguments solely or primar
ily against legalism in the first sense, and leave open the pos
sibility of a “mixed” ethics in which rules and other types of
ethical principles (regarding goals or motives, for instance)
both play essential roles. Such mixed systems or “limited”
legalisms could avoid abstraction from reality and complex
casuistry as well as could situationism.

rhe situationist attack on legalism is particularly vulner
able when it appeals to the examples of Jesus and Paul. Form
criticism has demonstrated that many of the “situations” within
which gospel sayings are placed are simply bits of editorial
framework provided by the gospel writers, in order to connect
sayings and stories that had circulated independently in the
oral tradition. The original “situations” in which Jesus pro
nounced many of his sayings are unknown. Moreover, a com
parison of Jesus’ woes against the Pharisees in Matthew with
parallel material in Luke shows that the striking invective,
“Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites!” was composed
by “Matthew.” Indeed, most of Jesus’ attack on the Pharisees
was probably not original with Jesus; it reflects rather the later
hostility between the first-century Christian church and the
rabbinic leaders of Judaism. Jesus no doubt did criticize
Pharisees, as lie likewise criticized Sadducees, Zealots, and
but little of this criticism was directed
probably Essenes
against their legalism. Even the attack on those who tithe
mint, dill, and cummin was capped by the comment: “These
you ought to have done, without neglecting the others”! (Mt.
23:23)
perhaps even an abrogaJesus did propose a relaxation
tion
of the Jewish Sabbath laws. In contrast, he demanded
a drastic tightening of the Jewish laws regarding murder (Mt.
5:21-22), divorce (Mk. 10:2-12), swearing (Mt. 5:33-37), and
retaliation. (Mt. 5:38-42). The Gospel of Matthew pictures
Jesus as the author of a “new law” for the Christian church,
and this Gospel may well be at least partly right in its repre
sentation of Jesus’ intentions in ethics.
On the other hand, there is no doubt that Paul, an cxPharisee, did sharply criticize Pharisaic legalism. But what he
was really rejecting was the Pharisaic idea that we are justified
by obeying the law. He was apparently unaware of other pos
sible uses of law. His rhetoric was thus so unrestrained that
he was hard pressed to provide for ethical rules and restric
tions in Christian life, but he was clearly concerned that there
should be such rules. He ruled out such activities as “licenti
ousness, idolatry, sorcery, enmity,
drunkenness, carousing,

‘

‘
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and the like” by drawing a contrast between the “fruit of the
Spirit’ and the “works of the flesh.” (Gal. 5:19-23) He ruled
out prostitution by insisting that “not all things are helpful,”
even if “all things are lawful.” (I Cor. 6:12-20) He forbade
divorce between believers by an appeal to a saying of “the
Lord,” Jesus (1 Cor. 7:10-11). Paul can be cited as authority
for the rejection of certain forms of legalism, but not for the
rejection of all universal moral rules.
The situatbnists are as vulnerable in what they affirm as
love,
in what they deny. Their central affirmative principles
are by no means necessarily
or keeping human life human
opposed to rules and laws. Lehmann leaves the adjective
“human” undefined, but implies that it must center in con
creteness and spontaneity. But there is no intrinsic reason why
regularity arid dependability should be omitted from the basic
definition of being human, as theologian Daniel D. Williams
points out:
—

—

for his overarching insistence that “love
shoulders aside all
codes.”
34
The authors of tire Quaker pamphlet agree with Fletcher
“that love cannot be confined to a rigid pattern.”
35 They (10
provide a clear, specific content to their definition of love:
.

.

.

Loving does not merely mean doing good works.
it means warmth and intimacy, open-heartedness and overwhelming generosity of hand and
spirit. It means a desire to know and a courage
ous willingness to be known. Loving implies coin
mitment to the other person, involvement in that
Persons life, whatever it may cost in suffering;
warmth of giving and receiving;
depth and
36
understanding.
-

.

.

...

The other situationists recognize that “love’ is an extra
ordinarily ambiguous and slippery word, and therefore give
definitions of what they mean by it. According to Fletcher,
love “is an attitude, a disposition, a leaning, a preference, a
Its essential nature is volition, choice, commit
purpose.
33 However, Fletcher does not clearly specify
ment, purpose.”
what attitudes, dispositions, or purposes constitute love, except

Basically, all the situationists take for granted Brunner’s
dictum that “Love is concrete and personal, non-deliberate,
7
non-gencral.”
T’he situationists rule out all abstract, deliberate, general,
patterned elements from hove, by definition. But does love
have to be defined this way? As Paul Ramsey puts it, the
sititationists definition ‘‘means love’s inability’ to bind itself
one way and not another or in no way except in acts that are
the immediate response of one person’s depth to another’s
8 One New Testament dictum would, indeed, suggest
(Iej)thl.’
that at least sonic moral rules are included in the meaning of
love: “The commandments, ‘You shall not commit adultery,
You shall not kill, You shall not steal, You shall not covet,’ and
any other commandment, are summed up in this sentence, ‘You
shall love your neighbor as yourself’.” (Rom. 13:9)
The meaning of love in the New Testament is clarified
when we 1-ecognize its roots in such Old Testament concepts as
hesed
mercy, steadfast love, covenant love. Hesed is the
covenant-creating and covenant-sustaining love which God bears
toward his people. Hesed does involve an element of spon
taneity: God’s covenant with Israel was initiated by his mighty
act, in which lie delivered his people from slavery. This was
a free, spontaneous act, God’s free gift to his people, not based
on any worthiness or prominence on their part. But the forma

12

13

Certainly the Christian ethic is a personal ethic.
its aim is a society of free and responsible indi
viduals, with the life of each made more full and
more free through sharing in the life of all. But
we must not overlook the fact that in human
life the growth of wholesome personal relations
the
depends in part on tile existence of.
and
institutions
and
laws
in
factors
impersonal
We miss the wonder
rational ethical principles
of human personality if we look for it solely in
the factors of consciousness and mentality and
moral freedom. The most wonderful thing is that
these factors appear within and are co-ordinated
through the vast world of structures and processes
31
which arc not personal.
.

““

.

—

I
tion of the covenant created an atmosphere of trust and secur
ity. God revealed himself as dependable and trustworthy, and
thus removed any grounds for the servile fear of arbitrary,
capricious divine anger, which is characteristic of many primi
tive religions. His hesed is steadfast love, which endures for
ever and unchanged. And so, in the covenant relationship, the
people are likewise commanded to exercise hesed. They are
to make free, responsible ethical decisions, to go generously
beyond the letter of the law in dealing with the poor and the
weak. But they are also to behave in a regular, dependable
manner, in which they can be counted on not to break basic
moral laws.
This combiiiation of dependability and spontaneity in
inens cm enant-love is provided for in the fundamental laws
the Ten Commandments. These laws are
of the covenant
They set outer
“Thou shalt not
negatiae in form
of action are
forms
set
few
A
behavior.
limits to permissible
are too
adultery
commit
murder,
steal,
who
ruled out: those
covenantthe
of
upholders
responsible
be
undependable to
community. But within the boundaries set by the Ten Corn
and their negative form assures that these limits
mnandrnents
the individual has full freedom to make
are very broad
responsible decisions. Indeed, he must take full responsibility
for his use of this broad area of ethical freedom.
Any biblically-grounded definition ‘of love should include
free spontaneity and dependable regularity.
both dimensions
So defined, love will include a strictly limited number of pat
terns or laws. The situationists’ definition of love is, therefore,
not fully congruent with the basic biblical tradition, on which

.1

covenant community.

.

—

—-
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as Christians they rely.
The Quaker situationists are in further trouble because
of a dubious theological starting-point: “Morality should be
39 But
creative. God is primarily Creator, not rule-maker.”
biblically the idea of God as Creator is secondary; it is a corol
lary of the primary understanding of God as Redeemer, as the
one who delivers from slavery and initiates the covenant.
Similarly, early Friends viewed themselves as a restored new14

—

and not creation

—

r

—

—

The covenant

Lwas primary in their understanding of God.
The covenant involves a sharp irruption of the divine
reality into history. This leaves room for a radical critique
and revolutionary revision of unjust social orders, in which
change comes from outside the existing situation. It is at least
questionable whether a purely situational ethics can provide
[or such radical innovation in politics and economics.
The early Quakers emphasized continuing revelation. But
revelation comes through the “mighty acts of God,” in which
God encounters men in history. Quakerism simply affirms that
these acts are not yet ended. God’s mighty acts are covenant
making acts. In them God has elected a people to be his
own, established with them a compact of mutual faithfulness
and hesed, and set forth the terms under which this compact
is to be fulfilled. In them God breaks through the relativities
of history and speaks directly to his people. In these acts he
calls all men to himself; the words of the Lord in the Ten
Commandments and their reinterpretation in the teachings of
Jesus are normative not only for their own times but also for
all other historical situations.
These commands are not rules which must be followed
before God will redeem us; they provide the form in which our
grateful response to his redemption is to l)e channeled. “You
shall remember that you were a servant in the land of Egypt,
and the Lord your God brought you out thence with a mighty
hand and an outstretched arm; therefore the Lord your God
commanded you
(Deut. 5:15) This “therefore” helps us
avoid both extremes. Since the imperative is derived from a
concrete historical event, Christian ethics cannot be a corn
plete propositional system of universally applicable principles;
it cannot be legalism in the extreme sense. But since the divine
initiative took a particular historical form, which the “there
fore” brings to bear on each situation, Christian ethics cannot
be shaped solely by the situation of the present moment.
Jesus was the word of God, whose earthly career was the
mightiest of God’s mighty acts. In him God spoke directly to
his newly reconstituted people. What Jesus affirmed has been
.

1
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affirmed for all time; what he rejected has been rejected for all
time. In his controversies with the Pharisees, Sadducees, and
Zealots, he rejected war, wealthiness, and the respectability
afforded by a minutely spelled-out code of morality. He also
reinterpreted the Decalogue, affirming most of it, intensifying
some of its provisions, and radically revising others (notably
the Sabbath commandment).
Similarly, the great ethical insights of the seventeenthcentury mighty act of God are binding on those in the Quaker
tradition who look for God’s renewal and reconstitution of his
peopla in this clay. The peace testimony, the testimony against
respect of persons (which culminated in the rejection of
slavery), the testimonies for simplicity and for the sufficiency
of truth-telling are reinterpretations of the Decalogue and the
teachings of Jesus which remain mandatory.
Should there come a new mighty act of God in our own
(la\’, thcre may well be new ethical insights in consequence.
We cannot know for sure what these will be. But the record
to date suggests that they are likely to be reinterpretations or
intensifications of the already given basic commandments; only
once, antI then only on the personal authority of Jesus Christ
himself, has an earlier command been annulled.
We recognite in our day the need for a revival of church
discipline, as part of the quest for renewal. One reason for
the last century’s decline in church discipline is that it failed to
put first things first; it had degenerated into disownment for
“marrying out” or social harassment for petty sexual misde
meanors. The place to reinstate church discipline is surely in
the “weightier matters of the law, justice and mercy and faith”:
the pe2Ice testimony, racial discrimination, economic paternal
ism. It is no accident that the situationists have been most
insightful in dealing with sexual relations and medical ethics:
these are the areas in which the church has been most excessive
in its legalism; these are the areas in which church discipline
can afford to be the most patient and merciful.
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There are three clear strengths in Vail Palmer’s paper
which any contextual ethic must work hard to match: the
element of absolute obligation and obedience; the transcend
ence of the norm or command, “the ought” which is independ
ent of anything that “is”; and the effort at a universal ethic
free from relativism. Yet Vail Palmer himself admits that he
achieves this by a Kantian ethic ruled only by the form of acts.
Moreover, today we are watchful about uniform norms as
human rationalizing, like Plato’s and Aristotle’s efforts to jus
tify slavery. Also we suspect absolute ethics for their element
of self-righteousness or at least our psychological hunger for
assurance we are right.
In any case, it seems to me that Vail Palmer breaks away
from his
formal ethic when he bases his norms on God’s
actions in history: all the more in that the form he adopts is
hesed, God’s own loyalty and response, with its concreteness,
warmth, and depth of love behind it, and that he defines hesed
in terms of dependability and responsibility. At this point
he falls back, to derive concrete norms, on the Decalogue as an
inherent part of the covenant. I’d suggest that Paul Lehmann
handles all this better, in making God’s acts and even the coyenant part of the context for our action, not the norm for it.
Vail Palmer himself notes that Emil Brunner uses “Die Ord
nungen” in this situational way, even when trying to absolutize
“Das Gebot.”
5 Even the Decalogue it seems to me better to use
as Reinhold Niebuhr does, as providing the norms of justice
by which love is guided, not commanded, rather than setting
Decalogue over against love as Vail Palmer does, as the neg
own
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1. The German title of Brunner’s Dos Gebot und die Ordnungen
keeps the distinction lost in the English Divine Imperative (1937).
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